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Abstract—In the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), data sharing among
vehicles is critical to improve driving safety and enhance vehic-
ular services. To ensure security and traceability of data shar-
ing, existing studies utilize consensus schemes as hard security
solutions to establish blockchain-enabled IoV (BIoV). However,
as miners are selected from miner candidates by stake-based
voting, defending against voting collusion between the candidates
and compromised high-stake vehicles becomes challenging. To
address the challenge, in this paper, we propose a two-stage
soft security enhancement solution: (i) miner selection and (ii)
block verification. In the first stage, we design a reputation-based
voting scheme to ensure secure miner selection. This scheme
evaluates candidates’ reputation using both historical interactions
and recommended opinions from other vehicles. The candidates
with high reputation are selected to be active miners and standby
miners. In the second stage, to prevent internal collusion among
active miners, a newly generated block is further verified and
audited by standby miners. To incentivize the participation of
the standby miners in block verification, we adopt the contract
theory to model the interactions between active miners and
standby miners, where block verification security and delay are
taken into consideration. Numerical results based on a real-world
dataset confirm the security and efficiency of our schemes for
data sharing in BIoV.
Index Terms—Internet of Vehicles, blockchain, reputation
management, delegated proof-of-stake, contract theory, security
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivations
With the rapid development of automobile industry and
the Internet of Things, vehicles generate a huge amount and
diverse types of data through advanced on-board devices.
Vehicles collect and share data to improve driving safety
and achieve better service quality [1]. However, there exist
significant security and privacy challenges for data sharing in
IoV. On the one hand, vehicles may not be willing to upload
data to infrastructures, e.g., through road-side units, with a
centralized management architecture because of the concern
on a single point of failure and personal data manipulation.
On the other hand, although Peer-to-Peer (P2P) data sharing
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among the vehicles can solve the issues of the centralized
management architecture, it is facing with the problems of
data access without authorization and security protection in
a decentralized architecture. These challenges adversely affect
the circulation of vehicle data, even forming data ‘island’, and
thus hinder the future development of IoV [2].
Recently, integrating blockchain technology with IoV has
attracted increasing attention of researchers and developers
because of decentralization, anonymity, and trust character-
istics of blockchain. A secure, trusted, and decentralized
intelligent transport ecosystem is established by blockchain
to solve vehicle data sharing problems [2], [3]. The authors
in [1] proposed a decentralized trust management system for
vehicle data credibility assessment using blockchain with joint
Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus
schemes. Vehicle manufacturers Volkswagen [4] and Ford [5]
have applied for patents that enable secure inter-vehicle com-
munication through blockchain technologies. An intelligent
vehicle-trust point mechanism using proof-of-driving-based
blockchain is presented to support secure communications and
data sharing among vehicles [6], [7]. Li et al. [8] proposed
a privacy-preserving incentive announcement network based
on public blockchain. The Byzantine fault tolerance algorithm
is adopted to incentivize vehicles to share traffic informa-
tion. Nevertheless, there exists exorbitant cost to establish
a blockchain in resource-limited vehicles using computation-
intensive PoW or unfair stake-based PoS [9]. Existing research
attempts cannot neatly address the P2P data sharing problem
among vehicles in IoV.
In this paper, we utilize high-efficiency Delegated Proof-of-
Stake (DPoS) consensus scheme as a hard security solution to
develop a secure P2P data sharing system for IoV. Previous
study has demonstrated that a DPoS scheme is particularly
suitable and practical for IoV [10], which performs the con-
sensus process on pre-selected miners with moderate cost [11].
RoadSide Units (RSUs) as edge computing infrastructures,
which are widely deployed over the whole road networks and
easily reachable by vehicles, can be the miners because of
having sufficient computation and storage resources [1], [12],
[13]. These miners play significant roles to publicly audit and
store vehicle data and data sharing records in blockchain-
enabled IoV (BIoV). Traditionally, miners in DPoS schemes
are selected by stake-based voting. Note that the vehicles with
stakes act as stakeholders in BIoV [14]. The stakeholders with
more stake have higher voting power. However, this approach
2suffers from the following collusion attacks in BIoV:
• Miner Voting Collusion: Malicious RSUs collude with
compromised high-stake stakeholders to be voted as
miners. These malicious miners may falsely modify or
discard transaction data during its mining process. Al-
though the malicious miners can be voted out of the
BIoV by the majority of well-behaved stakeholders in the
next voting round, the stakeholders may not participate
in all the voting rounds. Thus, some malicious miners
cannot be removed in a timely fashion, which enables the
malicious miners to launch attacks to damage the system
continuously [15], [16].
• Block Verification Collusion: Malicious miners may
internally collude with other miners to generate false
results in the block verification stage, even to launch
double-spending attack, which is also challenging [9],
[17].
Therefore, it is necessary to design an enhanced DPoS consen-
sus scheme with secure miner selection and block verification
to defend against the collusion attacks in BIoV [9].
B. Solutions and Contributions
Reputation is defined as the rating of an entity’s trust-
worthiness by others based on its past behaviors [1], [18],
[15]. Similar to existing studies, we utilize reputation as a
fair metric to propose a soft security solution for enhancing
DPoS schemes through two stages: (i) secure miner selection,
and (ii) reliable block verification. A reputation management
scheme established on blockchain technologies is proposed
for the miner selection. Miner candidates with high reputation
are selected to form a miner group including active miners and
standby miners, e.g., 21 active miners and 150 standby miners
in Enterprise Operation System (EOS) [19]. Each vehicle
has its reputation opinion on an interacting miner candidate
through a subjective logic model that combines recommended
opinions from other vehicles and its own opinions based on
historical interactions into an accurate reputation opinion [20].
All the reputation opinions of vehicles on the candidates are
recorded as reliable and tamper-proof reputation records in
transparent blockchain for reputation calculation.
Moreover, for secure block verification, blocks generated by
active miners can be further verified and audited by standby
miners to prevent internal collusion among active miners [21].
Here, the active miners take turn to act as the block manager
to generate and distribute unverified blocks. To incentivize
the standby miners to participate in the block verification, we
utilize contract theory to model interactions among the block
manager and miners to prevent collusion attacks. The block
manager works as a contract designer. Meanwhile, the miners
including active miners and standby miners are followers to
finish block verification for obtaining a part of transaction fee
according to verification contribution [21].
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
• We propose an enhanced DPoS consensus scheme with
two-stage soft security solution for secure vehicle data
sharing in BIoV.
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Fig. 1: The system model for blockchain-based IoV.
• In the miner selection stage, we introduce a secure and
efficient reputation management scheme by using a multi-
weight subjective logic model. Miner are selected by
reputation-based voting for decreasing collusion between
stakeholders with a lot of stake and miner candidates.
• In the block verification stage, high-reputation standby
miners are incentivized to participate in block verification
using contract theory for preventing internal collusion
among active miners.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present the
system model and the enhanced DPoS consensus scheme with
detailed steps for secure P2P vehicle data sharing in Section
II. We illustrate the secure reputation management scheme by
using the multi-weight subjective logic model in Section III.
The incentive mechanism for secure block verification using
contract theory is proposed in Section IV, followed by optimal
contract designing in Section V. We illustrate numerical results
in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND THE ENHANCED DPOS
ALGORITHM
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, vehicles equipped with on-board units
and advanced communication devices can access vehicular
services by communicating with nearby RSUs in BIoV. The
on-board units can perform simple computation, collect local
data from sensing devices, and upload the data to the RSUs.
Vehicles act as data collectors and share their own data with
data requesters through wireless communication. Next, the
vehicles upload their data sharing records as “transactions” to
nearby RSUs. RSUs are deployed along roads to ensure that
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Fig. 2: The enhanced DPoS consensus scheme for blockchain-based IoV.
the vehicles are able to communicate with other vehicles and
miners in a timely fashion [1], [12], [13]. Unlike traditional
DPoS schemes that miners are selected by stake-based voting,
RSUs with high reputation are selected as miners, whose
reputation values are calculated by a multi-weight subjective
logic model. More details about the model are given in
Section III. The data collectors share data with each other
and obtain a reward from data requesters. Next, the data
collectors upload data sharing records to active miners, and the
miners execute the consensus process of our enhanced DPoS
consensus scheme. Finally, the vehicle’s data sharing records
are stored as block data and added into a blockchain, named
vehicular blockchain, for achieving efficient proof of presence
of the data sharing.
The vehicular blockchain is also a public ledger that records
vehicles’ reputation opinions for RSUs and miners into the
block data. These reputation opinions are persistent and trans-
parent evidence when disputes and destruction occur [22].
Vehicles assess both RSUs during vehicular services and active
miners in the consensus process. The vehicles also download
the existing reputation opinions about these entities in ve-
hicular blockchain as recommended opinions. Then, vehicles
generate their reputation opinions through combining their
own assessments with the recommended opinions, and upload
these new opinions with digital signatures to new active miners
through nearby RSUs [1]. The miners perform the consensus
process similar to that in data sharing. All the vehicles can
obtain the latest RSUs’ reputation after the reputation opinions
being added into the vehicular blockchain. The system can
calculate the average reputation of RSUs according to the
reputation opinions in the vehicular blockchain, which is an
important metric for the miner selection in the next round of
the consensus process [22].
B. Adversary Model for DPoS Consensus Process
In traditional DPoS consensus schemes, miners are selected
from miner candidates according to stake-based voting among
stakeholders, i.e., vehicles with stake. In BIoV, as RSUs acting
as miner candidates may be distributed along the road without
sufficient security protection, they are semi-trusted and may
be vulnerable to be directly compromised by attackers [1],
[23]. Both stakeholders and miner candidates are vulnerable
to arbitrary manipulation by plutocrats [16], and become
compromised stakeholders and malicious miner candidates.
The plutocrats, i.e., attackers, can launch voting collusion that
compromises some high-stake stakeholders with greater voting
power, and ask the compromised stakeholders to vote some
certain miner candidates. Moreover, compromised vehicles in
BIoV can generate and upload fake reputation opinions to an
RSU in order to increase or decrease the reputation of the
target RSU [1]. Due to the overwhelming cost, we consider
that the attackers cannot compromise the majority of vehicles
[22]. Only a small subset of vehicles can be compromised
during a short period of time in BIoV [1], i.e., due to high
mobility of vehicles.
C. The Enhanced DPoS Scheme for Blockchain-based IoV
As depicted in Fig. 2, there are mainly three parts in the
enhanced DPoS consensus scheme for secure P2P vehicle
4data sharing: (i) updating block data (data sharing records
and reputation opinions from vehicles) and miner candidates
joining, (ii) reputation-based voting for miner selection and
(iii) secure block verification using contract theory. More
details about steps of the proposed parts are given in the
subsequent discussions.
Step 1: System Initialization: In vehicular blockchain, el-
liptic curve digital signature algorithm and asymmetric cryp-
tography are adopted for system initialization. Every entity
becomes legitimate after passing identity authentication by a
global Trust Authority (TA), e.g., a government department
of transportation1. Each legitimate entity obtains its public &
private keys and the corresponding certificates for information
encryption and decryption [11]. An RSU that wants to be a
miner candidate first submits its identity-related information to
the TA. As shown in Fig. 2, the TA verifies the validity of the
RSU by calculating its average reputation according to stored
reputation opinions from vehicles in the vehicular blockchain.
Only if the average reputation of this RSU is higher than a
threshold of trust, the RSU can become a miner candidate.
The threshold can be set according to different security-level
requirements [18], which is explained in Section VI-B.
Step 2: Miner candidate joining: Each miner candidate sub-
mits a deposit of stake to an account under public supervision
after being a miner candidate. This deposit will be confiscated
by the vehicular blockchain system if the candidate behaves
maliciously and causes damage during the consensus process,
e.g., failing to produce a block in its time slot [19], [24].
Step 3: Reputation calculation: As shown in Fig. 2, stake-
holders can calculate all miner candidates’ reputation by using
a subjective logic model, which is based on historical inter-
actions with the miner candidates and recommended opinions
from other vehicles. The subjective logic model takes three
weights about the historical interactions into consideration to
form the local opinion on each miner candidate. The latest
recommended opinions can be downloaded from the vehicular
blockchain. Thus each stakeholder combines its local opinion
with the recommended opinions to obtain a final reputation
opinion on every miner candidate. More details about the
reputation calculation are presented in Section III.
Step 4: Miner selection: According to the final reputation
opinions calculated by Step 3, as shown in Fig. 2, each
stakeholder votes for y candidates as the miners according to
its ranking of the final reputation opinions for the candidates.
Unlike traditional DPoS schemes, all the stakeholders have
the same weight in miner voting (same voting power) even
though some stakeholders owning larger stake. The top k
miner candidates with the highest reputation are selected to
be active miners and (y− k) miner candidates can be standby
miners. The active miners and standby miners form a miner
group in vehicular blockchain. Here y < k, and k is an odd
integer, such as 21 in EoS and 101 in Bitshares [19].
Step 5: Block manager generation: In line with traditional
DPoS schemes, each of the k active miners takes turn to act as
1Note that the TA is responsible for identity authorization, certificate
issuance and access control of entities before running vehicular blockchain.
That is, the TA does not affect the decentralization of the vehicular blockchain
[22].
the block manager during k time slots of the consensus pro-
cess. Similar to that in traditional DPoS consensus schemes,
every active miner plays the role of the block manager
to perform block generation, broadcasting, verification and
management in its time slot.
Step 6: Consensus process: As shown in Fig. 2, in a
time slot, the block manager first generates an unverified
block, and broadcasts this block to other active miners for
block verification. However, due to the limited number of
active miners, malicious active miners may launch the block
verification collusion attack to generate false block verification
results. In the block verification stage, the more verifiers result
in a more secure blockchain network [21]. Therefore, to defend
this attack and further enhance security performance of the
proposed DPoS consensus scheme, more verifiers are moti-
vated and incentivized to participate in the block verification
instead of only active miners finishing the verification. In other
words, the miners including active miners and standby miners
can act as verifiers and join the block verification process,
especially the high-reputation miners, which can prevent the
block verification collusion among the active miners. As such,
we then design an incentive mechanism by using contract
theory to encourage high-reputation miners to participate in
the block verification. In the incentive mechanism, the active
miner acts as the block manager and the contract designer
to broadcast contract items to miners. Meanwhile, the miners
choose and sign their best contract items. More details about
the block verification using contract theory are described in
Section IV.
In Fig. 2, for mutual supervision and verification, high-
reputation miners locally audit the data block and broadcast
their audit results with their signatures to each other. After
receiving the audit results, each miner compares its result with
those of other miners and sends a reply as a feedback to the
block manager. This reply consists of the miner’s audit result,
comparison result, signatures, and records of received audit
results. The block manager analyzes the received replies from
miners. If more than two third of the miners agree on the
data block, the block manager will send the records including
the current audited data block and the corresponding signature
to all of the miners for storage. Next, this block is stored in
the vehicular blockchain. The block manager is rewarded with
cryptocurrency, and the other miners participating in block
verification will receive a part of the transaction fee. After k
time slots, the group of miners and their categories, i.e., active
or standby miners, will be updated and shuffled through new
miner selection.
Step 7: Reputation updating: After each round of the con-
sensus process, vehicles download and check new data block
related to their data sharing records or reputation opinions in
the vehicular blockchain. If the data is correct, the vehicles will
update their reputation opinions for these miners and upload
their opinions to new miners of the next round of consensus
process. The miners perform consensus process in Step 6 to
add valid reputation values into the vehicular blockchain.
Note that traditional DPoS consensus schemes mainly in-
clude the following steps: miner selection, block mining
and generation, and block verification. The proposed DPoS
5consensus scheme only enhances the miner selection step and
block verification step for secure BIoV, while the block mining
and generation steps are the same as those in traditional DPoS
schemes. Therefore the enhanced steps are compatible with
traditional DPoS schemes.
III. EFFICIENT REPUTATION CALCUALTION USING
SUBJECTIVE LOGIC MODEL
If a positive interaction between vehicles and RSUs/miners
occurs, the vehicles will generate a positive rating for the
RSUs/miners. Consequently, the vehicle’s local reputation
opinion on the RSUs/miners is increased. The positive in-
teraction means that the vehicles believe that the services
provided by RSUs is relevant and useful or the new data
block generated by a miner is true. Note that the miner
candidates with high reputation acting as miners can ensure
a secure and reliable consensus process. On the contrary,
some compromised vehicles may generate fake rating because
of collusion with malicious RSUs or selfish purpose. More
false ratings cause more negative effects on miner selection
in the proposed DPoS scheme, thus resulting in unreliable
and insecure BIoV. Therefore, it is necessary to design a
secure and efficient reputation management scheme of RSUs,
and also to defend against the collusion between RSUs and
vehicles. Vehicles choose their own best miner candidates as
the miners according to reputation calculation [25]. A multi-
weight subjective logic model for reputation calculation is
proposed in this section.
Subjective logic is utilized to formulate individual eval-
uation of reputation based on historical interactions and
recommended opinions. It is a framework for probabilistic
information fusion operated on subjective beliefs about the
world. The subjective logic utilizes the term “opinion” to
denote the representation of a subjective belief, and models
positive, negative statements and uncertainty. It also offers a
wide range of logical operators to combine and relate different
opinions [18]. In this paper, each vehicle (stakeholder) calcu-
lates reputation opinion taking all the recommended opinions
into consideration. Due to the limited number of compromised
vehicles, the false recommended opinions from the compro-
mised vehicles have less effect on reputation calculation using
subjective logic model since most vehicles are well-behaved
and reliable.
A. Local Opinions for Subjective Logic
Considering a vehicle Vi and an RSU Rj , the vehicle may
interact with the RSU during driving, e.g., crowdsensing or
vehicle data sharing. The trustworthiness (i.e., local opinion)
of Vi to Rj in the subjective logic can be formally described
as a local opinion vector ωi→j := {bi→j , di→j , ui→j}, where
bi→j , di→j , and ui→j represent the belief, distrust, and un-
certainty, respectively. We consider that all of the vehicles
have the same evaluation criteria to generate local opinions.
Here, bi→j , di→j , ui→j ∈ [0, 1] and bi→j + di→j + ui→j = 1.
According to the subjective logic model [20], [18], we have

bi→j = (1− ui→j)
α
α+β ,
di→j = (1 − ui→j)
β
α+β ,
ui→j = 1− si→j .
(1)
α is the number of positive interactions and β is the number
of negative interactions. The communication quality si→j of a
link between vehicles i and j, i.e., the successful transmission
probability of data packets, determines the uncertainty of local
opinion vector ui→j [18]. According to ωi→j , the reputation
value Ti→j represents the expected belief of vehicle Vi that
RSU Rj is trusted and behaves normally during consensus
process, which is denoted by
Ti→j = bi→j + γui→j . (2)
Here, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the given constant indicating an effect
level of the uncertainty for reputation [20].
B. Multi-weight Local Opinions for Subjective Logic
Local opinions using the subjective logic model are affected
by different factors. Traditional subjective logic is evolved
toward multi-weight subjective logic when considering weight-
ing operations. Similar to [18], we consider the following
weights to formulate local opinions.
• Interaction Frequency: It is known that the higher inter-
action frequency means that vehicle Vi has more prior
knowledge about RSU Rj . The interaction frequency
between Vi and Rj is the ratio of the number of times
that Vi interacts with Rj to the average number of times
that Vi interacts with other RSUs during a time window
T , i.e.,
IFi→j =
Ni→j
Ni
, (3)
where Ni→j = (αi + βi), and Ni =
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
Ni→s. S is
the set of all of the RSUs (denoted as RSUs) interacting
with Vi during the time window. The higher interaction
frequency leads to higher reputation.
• Interaction Timeliness: In BIoV, a vehicle is not always
trusted and reliable. Both the trustfulness and reputation
of Vi to Rj are changing over time. The recent interac-
tions have higher impact on the local opinion of Vi to Rj .
The time scale of recent interactions and past interactions
is defined by trecent, e.g., three days. The recent interac-
tions and past interactions have different weights on the
local opinions of vehicles. The parameter ζ represents the
weight of recent interactions, and σ represents the weight
of past interactions. ζ + σ = 1, ζ > σ.
• Interaction Effects: Note that positive interactions in-
crease RSUs’ reputation and negative interactions de-
crease the reputation of RSUs. Therefore, the negative
interactions have a higher weight on the local opinions
of vehicles than that of the positive interactions. Here,
the weight of positive interactions is θ, and the weight
of negative interactions is τ , where θ + τ = 1, θ < τ.
The weights of interaction timeliness and interaction
6effects are combined together to form a new interaction
frequency as follows:{
αi = ζθα
i
1 + σθα
i
2,
βi = ζτβ
i
1 + στβ
i
2.
(4)
The positive and negative recent interactions are αi1
and βi1 when the current time t satisfies t ≤ trecent,
respectively. When t > trecent, the positive and negative
past interactions are αi2 and β
i
2, respectively. Therefore,
the interaction frequency between two vehicles is updated
as follows:
IFi→j =
Ni→j
Ni
=
θ(ζαi1 + σα
i
2) + τ(ζβ
i
1 + σβ
i
2)
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
Ni→s
. (5)
Therefore, the overall weight of reputation for local
opinions is δi→j = ρi ∗ IFi→j, where 0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1 is pre-
defined parameter.
C. Recommended Opinions for Subjective Logic
After being weighted, the recommended opinions are com-
bined into a common opinion in the form of ωrecx→j :=
{brecx→j, d
rec
x→j , u
rec
x→j}. Here,

brecx→j =
1∑
x∈X
δx→j
∑
x∈X
δx→jbx→j,
drecx→j =
1∑
x∈X
δx→j
∑
x∈X
δx→jdx→j ,
urecx→j =
1∑
x∈X
δx→j
∑
x∈X
δx→jux→j,
(6)
where x ∈ X is a set of recommenders that are other vehicles
had interacted with Rj . Thus, the subjective opinions from
different recommenders are combined into one single opinion,
which is called the recommended opinion according to each
opinion’s weight [15].
D. Combining Local Opinions with Recommended Opinions
After obtaining ratings of Rj from other vehicles, a partic-
ular vehicle has a subjective opinion (i.e., local opinion) on
each vehicle based on its interaction history. This local opinion
should still be considered while forming the final reputation
opinion to avoid cheating [15]. The final reputation opinion
of Vi to Rj is formed as ω
final
x→j := {b
final
x→j , d
final
x→j , u
final
x→j },
where b
final
i→j , d
final
i→j and u
final
i→j are respectively calculated as
follows [18]:

b
final
i→j =
bi→ju
rec
x→j+b
rec
x→jui→j
ui→j+urecx→j−u
rec
x→j
ui→j
,
d
final
i→j =
di→ju
rec
x→j+d
rec
x→jui→j
ui→j+urecx→j−u
rec
x→j
ui→j
,
u
final
i→j =
urecx→jui→j
ui→j+urecx→j−u
rec
x→j
ui→j
.
(7)
Similar to Eqn. (2), the final reputation opinion of Vi to Rj
is
T
final
i→j = b
final
i→j + γu
final
i→j . (8)
The final reputation opinions can be used in different steps of
the proposed DPoS scheme. For Step 2 and Step 7 in Section
II-C, after obtaining the final reputation opinion on an RSU,
vehicles will upload and store their final reputation opinions as
recommended opinions for other vehicles (stakeholders) in the
vehicular blockchain. For Step 3 and Step 4 in Section II-C,
stakeholders vote high-reputation miner candidates according
to the reputation opinions.
IV. INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR SECURE BLOCK
VERIFICATION USING CONTRACT THEORY
After selecting high-reputation miner candidates as active
miners by using the multi-weight subjective logic model, there
still exists a potential block verification collusion attack in
the vehicular blockchain. In this section, for secure block
verification, we aim to design an incentive mechanism to
motivate more miners (both active miners and standby miners)
to participate in the block verification. Every block manager
will offer a part of the transaction fee as a reward to verifiers
that participate in block verification and accomplish the tasks
in time. Nevertheless, to do so, there are issues for the
block manager in every consensus process. Firstly, the block
manager does not have prior knowledge about which miners
would like to participate in verification. Secondly, it does
not have an accurate reputation value of a verifier. Thirdly,
it does not know the amount of resource that each verifier
would contribute. The information asymmetry between the
block manager and verifiers may incur too much cost for the
block manager to give an incentive to the verifiers. Thus,
the best strategy for the block manager is to design an
incentive mechanism that can reduce the impact of information
asymmetry. Moreover, the verifiers that contribute more should
be rewarded more. Thus, we adopt contract theory [26] in
designing the incentive mechanism.
In the kth block verification, consider a monopoly market
consisting of a block manager acting as the task publisher
and a set of verifiers M = {M1, . . . ,Mm} including active
miners and standby miners. Verifiers are willing to contribute
different computation resources C = {ck1 , . . . , c
k
m}, i.e., CPU
cycles per unit time to execute the block verification. Ik and
Ok are the sizes of the transmitted block before verification
and the verified results, respectively [26]. For simplicity, for all
verifiers, the values of Ik and Ok respectively are the same in
the kth block verification. For a verifier m, the occupied CPU
resource of block verification task is Taskkm. Here, we consider
that Taskk1 = Task
k
2 = · · · = Task
k
m. Therefore, the block
verification task is denoted as a three tuple (Taskkm, Ik,Ok).
To attract more high-reputation verifiers, we define reputation
as the type of a verifier. There are Q types, and the verifiers
are sorted in an ascending order of reputation: θ1 < · · · <
θq < · · · < θQ, q ∈ {1, . . . , Q}. The larger θq implies a
higher reputation verifier for secure block verification among
miners [9], [21].
With information asymmetry, the block manager should
design specific contracts to overcome its economic loss. For
different types of verifiers with different reputations, the block
manager offers the verifiers a contract (Rq(L
−1
q ), L
−1
q ), which
includes a series of latency-reward bundles. Here, Lq is the
latency of block verification for type-q verifiers and L−1q is
the reciprocal of Lq. Rq(L
−1
q ) is the corresponding incentive.
7Note that if verifiers finish block verification faster, i.e., with
smaller latency, can be rewarded more incentive [26].
A. Latency in Block Verification
As mentioned in Step 6 of Section II-C, there are four steps
in the block verification process for a verifier: (i) unverified
block transmission from the block manager to verifiers, (ii)
local block verification, (iii) verification result broadcasting
and comparison among verifiers, and (iv) verification feedback
transmission from the verifiers to the manager. For a verifier
m, the latency consisting of the corresponding delays of the
aforementioned steps is defined as follows [26],
Lq(c
k
m, Ik, Ok) =
Ik
rdm
+
Taskkm
ckm
+ ψIk |M|+
Ok
rum
. (9)
rum is the uplink transmission rate from the verifiers to block
manager and rdm is the downlink transmission rate from the
block manager to the verifiers. The transmission time of an
unverified block from the block manager to the verifier is Ik
rdm
.
The local verification time of this block is
Taskkm
ckm
. Similar to
that in [21], [27], the time of verification result broadcasting
and comparison among verifiers is a function of the block
size Ik , network scale (i.e., the number of verifiers |M|) and
average verification speed of each verifiers, which is denoted
as ψIk |M|. Here, ψ is a pre-defined parameter of verification
result broadcasting and comparison, which can be obtained
from statistics of previous block verification processes. The
time of verification feedback is Ok
rum
.
rum and r
d
m can be calculated based on wireless link speed,
e.g., the Shannon capacity. Let locations of verifiers fix during
block verification. We apply the Time-Division Medium Ac-
cess (TDMA) technique, where the uplink and downlink use
the same frequency channel [26]. Then, we have
rum = r
d
m = Blog2(1 +
̟m|hm|
2∑
m−∈M\{m}
̟m− |hm− |2 +N0B
),
(10)
where B is the transmission bandwidth and ̟m is the trans-
mission power of verifier m. hm is the channel gain of peer-
to-peer link between the verifier m and the block manager
or other verifiers. N0 is the one-sided power spectral density
level of white Gaussian noise, and m− is an element in M
excluding m.
B. Profit of the Block Manager
According to the signed contract (Rq, L
−1
q ) between the
block manager and type-q verifier, the profit of the block
manager obtained from type-q verifier is denoted as
Ubm(q) = π[φq(Lq)]− lRq, (11)
where l is a pre-defined weight parameter about the type-
q verifier’s incentive Rq. π[φq(Lq)] is the benefit of the
block manager regarding a security-latency metric φq for type-
q verifier. Intuitively, the block manager obtains a higher
profit when the φq is bigger. Moreover, both more high-
reputation verifiers and less latency can lead to bigger φq , i.e.,
∂pi(φq)
φq
> 0,
∂φq(Lq)
θq
> 0 and
∂φq(Lq)
Lq
< 0. The more verifiers
participating in block verification leads to more secure block
verification stage. However, this causes larger latency since
the verifiers may need to communicate with verifiers through
multi-hop relays [21]. Similar to that in [21], [28], we define
a more general security-latency metric to balance the network
scale and the block verification time for type-q verifier, which
is expressed by
φq =
{
e1(θq|M|pq)
z1 − e2(
Lq
Tmax
)z2 , if 0 < Lq < A,
0, otherwise.
(12)
Here A =
Tmaxe1
z
−1
2 (θq|M|pq)
z1
z2
e2
z
−1
2
. e1 > 0 and e2 > 0 are pre-
defined coefficients about the network scale and verification
latency, respectively. pq is the prior probability of type-q,
and
∑Q
q=1 pq = 1. We consider that the block manager can
obtain the distribution of verifier types from observations and
statistics of previous behaviours of the verifiers [26]. Tmax
denotes the maximum tolerable block verification latency to
blockchain users. z1 ≥ 1 and z2 ≥ 1 are given factors
indicating the effects of network scale and verification latency
on block verification, respectively. The goal of the block
manager is to maximize its profit through block verification
as follows:
max
(Rq,L
−1
q )
Ubm(q) =
Q∑
q=1
(|M|pq)(π[φq(Lq)]− lRq). (13)
C. Utility of Block Verifiers
For type-q verifier, the utility function of block verification
based on a signed contract is defined as
Uq = θqη(Rq)− l
′L−1q , (14)
where η(Rq) is a monotonically increasing valuation function
of type-q verifier in terms of the incentive Rq . l
′ is the unit
resource cost of block verification. Moreover, the valuation
is zero when there is no incentive, i.e., η(0) = 0. The
higher type-q verifier should have larger utility because of
higher reputation in block verification. However, the verifier
wants to maximize its utility through minimizing resource
consumption in block verification. Specifically, the objective
of type-q verifier is to maximize utility obtained by joining
block verification, expressed by
max
(Rq,L
−1
q )
Uq = θqη(Rq)− l
′L−1q , ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q}. (15)
V. OPTIMAL CONTRACT DESIGNING
According to [29], to make contracts feasible, each contract
item for verifiers must satisfy the following principles: (i)
Individual Rationality (IR) and (ii) Incentive Compatibility
(IC). IR means that each verifier will join the block verification
when it receives a non-negative utility, i.e.,
θqη(Rq)− l
′L−1q ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} . (16)
8IC refers to that type-q verifier can only receive the maximum
utility when choosing the contract designed for itself instead
of all other contracts (Rq′ , L
−1
q′ ), i.e.,
θqη(Rq)− l
′L−1q ≥ θqη(Rq′ )− l
′L−1q′ ,
∀q, q′ ∈ {1, . . . , Q} , q 6= q′.
(17)
In what follows, we consider π[φq(Lq)] =
g1[e1(θq|M|pq)
z1 − e2(
Lq
Tmax
)z2 ] for ease of presentation,
where g1 is unit profit gain for the block manager. Therefore,
the optimization problems in (13) and (15) can be defined as
follows:
max
(Rq,L
−1
q )
Ubm =
Q∑
q=1
|M|pq[g1e1(θq|M|pq)
z1 − g1e2(
Lq
Tmax
)
z2
− lRq]
s.t.
θqη(Rq)− l
′L−1q ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} ,
θqη(Rq)− l
′L−1q ≥ θqη(Rq′)− l
′L−1q′ , ∀q, q
′ ∈ {1, . . . , Q} ,
q 6= q′,
max{Lq} ≤ Tmax, ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} ,
Q∑
q=1
|M|pqRq ≤ Rmax, ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} ,
(18)
where Rmax is a given transaction fee from blockchain users.
This problem is not a convex optimization problem. How-
ever, we can find its solution by performing the following
transformation.
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity). For contract (Ri, L
−1
i ) and
(Rj , L
−1
j ), we have Ri ≥ Rj and L
−1
i ≥ L
−1
j , if and only if
θi ≥ θj , i 6= j, and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , Q}.
Proof: According to the IC constraints of type-i verifier and
type-j verifier, we have
θiη(Ri)− l
′L−1i ≥ θiη(Rj)− l
′L−1j , (19)
θjη(Rj)− l
′L−1j ≥ θjη(Ri)− l
′L−1i . (20)
By adding together (19) and (20), we can obtain (θi −
θj)[η(Ri) − η(Rj)] ≥ 0. η(Rq) ≥ 0 is a monotonically
increasing valuation function of Rq. When θi ≥ θj , we can
deduce that η(Ri)−η(Rj) ≥ 0, i.e., Ri ≥ Rj . When Ri ≥ Rj ,
we have η(Ri)−η(Rj) ≥ 0. Thus, we can deduce that θi ≥ θj
must be satisfied [30].
Proposition 1: Ri ≥ Rj , if and only if L
−1
i ≥ L
−1
j .
Proof: According to the IC constraint in (19), we can obtain
θi[η(Ri)− η(Rj)] ≥ l
′(L−1i − L
−1
j ), (21)
θj [η(Ri)− η(Rj)] ≤ l
′(L−1i − L
−1
j ). (22)
As L−1i ≥ L
−1
j , we have η(Ri) ≥ η(Rj) according to (21),
and thus Ri ≥ Rj . In addition, when Ri ≥ Rj , we can
obtain L−1i ≥ L
−1
j from (22). Proposition 1 indicates that
an incentive compatibility contract requires a higher payment,
if verifiers have less latency in block verification. 
Lemma 2. If the IR constraint of type-1 verifier is satisfied,
the IR constraints of other types will hold.
Proof: According to the IC constraints, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , Q},
we have
θiη(Ri)− l
′L−1i ≥ θiη(R1)− l
′L−11 . (23)
Given that θ1 < · · · < θi < · · · < θQ, we also have
θiη(R1)− l
′L−11 ≥ θ1η(R1)− l
′L−11 . (24)
According to (23) and (24), we have
θiη(Ri)− l
′L−1i ≥ θ1η(R1)− l
′L−11 ≥ 0. (25)
The (25) indicates that with the IC condition, when the IR
constraint of type-1 verifier is satisfied, the other IR constraints
will also hold. Therefore, the other IR constraints can be bound
into the IR condition of type-1 verifier [30]. 
Lemma 3. By utilizing the monotonicity in Lemma 1,
the IC condition can be transformed into the Local Downward
Incentive Compatibility (LDIC), which is given as follows:
θiη(Ri)− l
′L−1i ≥ θiη(Ri−1)− l
′L−1i−1, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , Q} .
(26)
Proof: The IC constraints between type-i and type-j, j ∈
{1, . . . , i − 1} are defined as Downward Incentive Compati-
bility (DIC), given by θiη(Ri)− l
′L−1i ≥ θiη(Rj)− l
′L−1j .
The IC constraints between type-i and type-j, j ∈ {i +
1, . . . , Q} are defined as Upward Incentive Compatibility
(UIC), given by θiη(Ri)− l
′L−1i ≥ θiη(Rj)− l
′L−1j .
We first prove that DIC can be reduced as two adjacent
types in DIC, called LDIC. Consider three continuous types
of verifiers, i.e., θi−1 < θi < θi+1, i ∈ {2, . . . , Q − 1}, we
have
θi+1η(Ri+1)− l
′L−1i+1 ≥ θi+1η(Ri)− l
′L−1i , (27)
θiη(Ri)− l
′L−1i ≥ θiη(Ri−1)− l
′L−1i−1. (28)
According to the monotonicity, i.e., if θi ≥ θj , then Ri ≥ Rj ,
i 6= j, and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , Q}, we have
(θi+1 − θi)[η(Ri)− η(Ri−1)] ≥ 0, (29)
θi+1[η(Ri)− η(Ri−1)] ≥ θi[η(Ri)− η(Ri−1)]. (30)
Combine (28) and (30), we have θi+1[η(Ri) − η(Ri−1)] ≥
θi[η(Ri)− η(Ri−1)] ≥ l
′L−1i − l
′L−1i−1. Thus, we have
θi+1η(Ri)− l
′L−1i ≥ θi+1η(Ri−1)− l
′L−1i−1. (31)
Combine (27) and (31), we have
θi+1η(Ri+1)− l
′L−1i+1 ≥ θi+1η(Ri−1)− l
′L−1i−1. (32)
We can extend (32) to prove that the DIC can be held until
type-1:
θi+1η(Ri+1)− l
′L−1i+1 ≥ θi+1η(Ri−1)− l
′L−1i−1 ≥
· · · ≥ θ1η(R1)− l
′L−11 , ∀ i.
(33)
Hence, note that with the LDIC and the monotonicity, the DIC
holds. Similarly, with the monotonicity and the Local Upward
Incentive Compatibility (LUIC), the UIC can be proved to
hold [29], [30].
9According to Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, the optimization problem
can be reformulated as follows:
max
(Rq,L
−1
q )
Ubm =
Q∑
q=1
|M|pq[g1e1(θq|M|pq)
z1 − g1e2(
Lq
Tmax
)z2
− lRq]
s.t.
θ1η(R1)− l
′L−11 = 0,
θqη(Rq)− l
′L−1q = θqη(Rq−1)− l
′L−1q−1, ∀q ∈ {2, . . . , Q} ,
max{Lq} ≤ Tmax, ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} ,
Q∑
q=1
|M|pqRq ≤ Rmax, ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} .
(34)
Furthermore, to simplify the analysis without loss of gen-
erality, we define the concave function η(Rq) = Rq . The
optimization problem in (34) is solved sequentially. Firstly,
we solve the relaxed problem in (34) without monotonicity to
obtain a solution. Secondly, we verify that whether the solution
satisfies the condition of the monotonicity. We use the method
of iterating the IC and IR constraints to obtain Rq which can
be expressed as follows:
Rq =
l′L−11
θ1
+
∑q
k=2
∆k, (35)
where ∆k =
l′L
−1
k
θk
−
l′L−1
k−1
θk
and ∆1 = 0. By substituting Rq
into
Q∑
q=1
|M|pqRq, we have
Q∑
q=1
|M|pqlRq = |M|
Q∑
q=1
lfqL
−1
q , (36)
where
fq =


l′pq
θq
+
(
l′
θq
− l
′
θq+1
) Q∑
i=q+1
pi, if q < Q,
l′pQ
θQ
, if q = Q.
(37)
We substitute the expression in (36) into the problem in (34)
and remove all Rq , ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} from the problem in (34).
The problem in (34) is rewritten as follows:
max
(Rq,L
−1
q )
Ubm =
Q∑
q=1
|M|pq[g1e1(θq|M|pq)
z1 − g1e2(
1
L
−1
q Tmax
)z2 ]
− |M|l
Q∑
q=1
fqL
−1
q ,
s.t. L−1q ≥
1
Tmax
, ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} ,
|M|
Q∑
q=1
fqL
−1
q ≤ Rmax, ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} .
(38)
By differentiating Ubm with respect to L
−1
q , we have
∂Ubm
∂L
−1
q
=
|M|g1e2z2pq
T
z2
max
(L−1q )
−(z2+1) − |M|lfq , and
∂2Ubm
∂(L−1q )
2 =
−
|M|g1e2z2pq(z2+1)
T
z2
max
(L−1q )
−(z2+2) < 0. Thus, the function Ubm
is concave. The problem defined in (38) is a convex opti-
mization problem because the summation of concave functions
(Ubm) is still a concave function, and the constrains are affine.
We can obtain the optimal latency requirement L−1q
∗
and
the corresponding incentive R∗q by using convex optimization
tools. Moreover, if the types of verifiers follow uniformly
TABLE I: Parameter Setting in the Simulation
Parameter Setting
Interaction frequency
between vehicles and RSUs
[50, 200] times/week
Coverage range of RSUs [300, 500] m
Speed of vehicles [50, 150] km/h
Weight parameters θ = 0.4, τ = 0.6, ζ = 0.6, σ = 0.4, ρ = 1
Time scale of recent and past
events trecent
three days
Rate of compromised vehi-
cles
[10%, 90%]
Successful transmission
probability of data packets
[0.6, 1]
Vehicle to RSU bandwidth 20 MHz
Noise spectrum density -174 dBm/Hz
Transmission power [10, 23] dBm
Receiver power 14 dBm
Computation resource [103, 106] CPU cycles/unit time
Input/output block data size [50, 500] KB
Pre-defined parameters g1 = 1.2, e1 = 15, e2 = 10, z1 = 2,
z2 = 1, l = 5, l
′ = 1, Tmax = 300 s,
Rmax = 1000, ψ = 0.5
distributed, the monotonicity can be automatically met [29],
[30]. If not, we can use infeasible sub-sequence replacing
algorithm to satisfy the final optimal latency requirement [31].
Note that the proposed incentive mechanism based on con-
tract theory can encourage efficiently high-reputation miners
to join the block verification for further improving the security
of the vehicular blockchain.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of the
proposed Multi-Weight Subjective Logic (MWSL) scheme
based on a real-world dataset of San Francisco Yellow Cab
[32]. Next, we evaluate and compare the performance of
the proposed incentive mechanism based on contract theory.
The mobility traces of 536 taxis driving during a month are
recorded in this dataset. We observe 200 taxis running in an
urban area, whose latitude and longitude are from 37.7 to
37.81 and from -122.52 to -122.38, respectively. Fig. 3 shows
trace points of the 200 taxis during a month. The average
time gap between two trace records is 43.34 seconds. There
are 400 RSUs (miner candidates) deployed uniformly in the
observation area. The update period of RSUs’ reputation is
1 minute. These miner candidates are initially classified into
10 types according to their reputation values, wherein the
probability for an candidate belonging to a certain type is 0.1.
Major parameters used in the simulation are given in Table I,
most of which are adopted from [18], [26], [30].
A. Performance of the proposed reputation scheme
In the proposed MWSL scheme, vehicles calculate rep-
utation value of miner candidates according to local opin-
ions and recommended opinions from other vehicles. We
compare our MWSL scheme with a Traditional Subjective
Logic (TSL) scheme which is a typical model using a lin-
ear function to calculate reputation [18]. More specifically,
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Fig. 3: Spatial distribution of vehicle trace points.
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T li→j = (1− κ)Tave + κTlas, where Tave = b
ave
x→j + 0.5u
ave
x→j
and Tlas = b
las
i→j+0.5u
las
i→j . Here κ is the weight and is set to
be 0.5. bavei→j and u
ave
i→j are average values of other vehicles’
bi→j and ui→j , respectively. b
las
i→j and u
las
i→j are the latest bi→j
and ui→j in the local opinion of vehicle i for RSU j. We
consider a malicious miner candidate will firstly pretend to
behave well to obtain positive reputation values from vehicles
in the former 5 minutes. Then, this candidate colludes with
10 compromised vehicles and begins to misbehave to 50 well-
behaved vehicles randomly. These misbehaving vehicles will
generate negative reputation opinions for the candidate, while
the colluded vehicles still generate positive reputation opinions
for the candidate and vote it as a miner in the voting stage.
Fig. 4 shows reputation variation of a malicious miner can-
didate from the perspective of a well-behaved vehicles under
three cases: (i) traditional DPoS scheme without reputation,
(ii) TSL scheme, and (iii) MWSL scheme. In the traditional
DPoS scheme without reputation, the reputation value of the
compromised candidate evaluated by the vehicle is linear
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increasing because the well-behaved vehicle cannot detect
the candidate’s misbehaviors for other well-behaved vehicles.
However, in the cases of TSL and our MWSL schemes, the
reputation values of the candidate sharply decrease because
of recommended opinions from other vehicles. The reputation
value decreasing below reputation threshold of trusted miner in
the MWSL scheme is faster than that of TSL because of the
weights of interaction frequency, timeliness, and interaction
effects on both recommended opinions and local opinions.
This can avoid being misleading by compromised vehicles’
recommended reputation opinions. As a result, our MWSL
scheme achieves more accurate reputation calculation, and this
therefore leads to more secure miner voting.
We observe the detection rate of 10 malicious miner candi-
dates using the TSL and MWSL schemes during 60 minutes.
Figure 5 shows that the MWSL scheme has much higher
successful detection rate of malicious miners than that in the
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TSL scheme. We define a metric as the reputation threshold of
successful detection, in which only the reputation of malicious
miners below the threshold can be detected successfully. When
the reputation threshold of successful detection is 0.5, the
detection rate of the MWSL scheme is 100%, which is 100%
higher than that of the TSL scheme. Due to higher detection
rate in the MWSL scheme, potential security threats can be
removed more effectively, which leads to a securer BIoV.
From Fig. 5, we can observe that successful detection
probability is not good enough when the reputation threshold
of successful detection is very low, e.g., 0.2. In the cases
with a very low threshold, the active miners generated by
reputation voting may launch the verification collusion attack,
that more than 1/3 active miners collude to generate false
verification result for a data block [33], [17]. To defend
this intractable attack, standby miners should participate in
block verification to improve the correct probability of verified
block. The correct probability of verified block means that
the data block is correctly verified without the effects of
the verification collusion attack. Figure 6 shows the correct
probability of data block after verification with respect to
different reputation thresholds of successful detection. When
the reputation threshold of successful detection is 0.2, the
correct probability in our MWSL scheme with standby miners
is 13% higher than that of MWSL scheme without standby
miners, while the TSL scheme without standby miners cannot
defend against this collusion attack. This indicates that the
proposed MWSL can ensure a secure block verification, even
when attackers launch internal active miner collusion.
B. Performance of the incentive mechanism based on contract
theory scheme
A block manager acting as the contract publisher announces
the designed contract items to other active miners and standby
miners. These miners choose a contract item (Rq, L
−1
q ) to
sign, and work as verifiers to finish the block verification
task according to latency requirements in the signed contract.
Finally, the verifiers obtain the corresponding incentives from
the contract publisher. Figure 7 shows the utilities of verifiers
with type 2, type 4, type 6 and type 8. We can see that each
type of verifiers obtains the maximum utility while selecting
the contract item exactly designed for its type, which explains
the IC constraint. All types of verifiers choose the contract
items corresponding to their types with non-negative utilities,
which validates the IR constraint [26].
We compare the profit of a block manager obtained from
the proposed contract model, and Stackelberg game model
from [30]. Figure 8 shows that the profit of a block manager
increases with the total number of verifier types. The more
verifier types bring both more verifiers and contract item
choices for high-type (high-reputation) verifiers, leading to
the more secure block verification. The utility of the pro-
posed contract model has better performance than that of the
Stackelberg game model. The reason is that in the monopoly
market, the proposed contract model provides limited contract
items to extract more benefits from the verifiers. However, in
the Stackelberg game model, rational verifiers can optimize
their individual utilities thus leading to less profit of the
block manager. Moreover, the Stackelberg game model with
symmetric information has better performance than that of
Stackelberg game model with asymmetric information. The
reason is that the game leader (the block manager) in the
Stackelberg game with symmetric information can optimize its
profit because of knowing the actions of followers (verifiers),
i.e., the symmetric information, and set the utilities of the
follows as zero [30].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced blockchain-based Internet
of vehicles for secure P2P vehicle data sharing by using a
hard security solution, i.e., the enhanced Delegated Proof-
of-Stake consensus scheme. This DPoS consensus scheme
has been improved by a two-stage soft security enhancement
solution. The first stage is to select miners by reputation-
based voting. A multi-weight subjective logic scheme has been
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utilized to calculate securely and accurately the reputation of
miner candidates. The second stage is to incentivize standby
miners to participate in block verification using contract the-
ory, which can further prevent internal collusion of active
miners. Numerical results have indicated that our multi-weight
subjective logic scheme has great advantages over traditional
reputation schemes in improving detection rate of malicious
miner candidates. Likewise, the proposed contract-based block
verification scheme can further decrease active miners collu-
sion and optimize the utilities of both the block manager and
verifiers to further improve the security of vehicle data sharing.
In the future work, we can further improve the accuracy of the
miner candidates’ reputation calculation through taking more
weights into consideration.
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